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Abstract
“Reason-based rationalizations” explain an agent’s choices by specifying which prop-
erties of the options or choice context he/she cares about (the “motivationally salient
properties”) and how he/she cares about these properties (the “fundamental prefer-
ence relation”). We characterize the choice-behavioural implications of reason-based
rationalizability and identify two kinds of context-dependent motivation in a reason-
based agent: he/she may (i) care about di↵erent properties in di↵erent contexts and
(ii) care not only about properties of the options, but also about properties relat-
ing to the context. Reason-based rationalizations can explain non-classical choice
behaviour, including boundedly rational and sophisticated rational behaviour, and
predict choices in unobserved contexts, an issue neglected in standard choice theory.
1 Introduction
The classical theory of individual choice faces many notorious problems. It is challenged
by empirically well-established violations of rationality due to framing e↵ects, menu-
dependent choice, susceptibility to nudges, the use of heuristics, unawareness, and other
related phenomena. For example, a redescription of the options can alter an agent’s
choice behaviour. Call this the problem of bounded rationality. The classical theory
is also challenged by its inability to explain some intuitively rational but sophisticated
forms of choice, such as choices based on norm-following or non-consequentialism. It
does not distinguish these from ordinary rationality violations. For example, someone
who never chooses the largest piece of cake o↵ered to him (or her) for politeness and
instead chooses the second largest violates the weak axiom of revealed preference and
⇤F. Dietrich, Paris School of Economics, CNRS, and University of East Anglia; C. List,
London School of Economics. This work has been presented on numerous occasions, beginning
with the LSE Choice Group workshop on “Rationalizability and Choice”, July 2011. We thank
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thus counts as “irrational”. Call this the problem of sophisticated rationality. We suggest
that the theory’s di culty in addressing both problems stems from the lack of a model
of how agents conceptualize options in any given choice context. When we provide such
a model, a unified explanation of many of the challenging phenomena can be given.
Our basic idea (which can be viewed as developing a classical idea in consumer
theory, e.g., Lancaster 1966) is the following. When an agent chooses between several
options in some context, e.g., yoghurts in a supermarket, he (or she) conceptualizes
each option not as a primitive object, but as a bundle of properties. Although each
option can have many properties, the agent considers not all of them, but only a subset:
the motivationally salient properties. In the supermarket, these may include whether
the yoghurt is fruit-flavoured, low-fat, and free from artificial sweeteners, but exclude
whether the yoghurt has an odd (as opposed to even) number of letters on its label (an
irrelevant property) and whether it has been sustainably produced (a property ignored
by many consumers). The agent then makes his choice on the basis of a fundamental
preference relation over property bundles. He chooses one option over another, e.g., a
low-fat cherry yoghurt over a full-fat, sugar-free vanilla one, if and only if his fundamental
preference relation ranks the set of motivationally salient properties of the first option,
say {low-fat, fruit-flavoured}, above the set of the second, say {full-fat, vanilla-flavoured,
artificially sweetened}.
We call an agent’s choice behaviour reason-based rationalizable if it can be explained
in this way. More precisely, a reason-based rationalization explains the agent’s choices
by specifying (i) which properties he cares about in each choice context and (ii) how he
cares about these properties. We formalize part (i) by a motivational salience function,
which assigns to each context a set of motivationally salient properties, and part (ii) by
a fundamental preference relation over property bundles.
Crucially, the motivationally salient properties may include not only (i) option prop-
erties, which options have independently of the choice context (and which are thus
“intrinsic” to the options), but also (ii) relational properties, which options have relative
to the context, and (iii) context properties, which are properties of the context alone.
“Fruit-flavoured” and “low-fat” (in yoghurts) are option properties; they depend solely
on the yoghurt. Whether a yoghurt is the only cherry yoghurt or the cheapest on display
are relational properties; they depend also on the other available yoghurts. Examples
of context properties are whether the available yoghurts include premium brands (this
depends solely on the menu of options) and whether there is cheerful background music
(this depends on features of the context over and above the menu).
Reason-based rationalizations can capture two kinds of context-dependence in an
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agent’s motivation. First, the context may a↵ect which properties are motivationally
salient, so that the agent cares about di↵erent properties in di↵erent contexts. We
call this context-variant motivation. For example, some contexts make the agent diet-
conscious, others not. Second, the motivationally salient properties may go beyond
option properties and include relational or context properties, so that the agent cares
about the context or about how the options relate to it. We call this context-regarding
motivation. For example, the agent cares about whether the choice of an option is polite
in the given context or whether there are luxury options available.
Many boundedly rational and sophisticated rational forms of choice can be sub-
sumed under these two kinds of context-dependence. Arguably, bounded rationality,
such as susceptibility to framing, nudging, or dynamic inconsistency, often involves
context-variant motivation. Sophisticated rationality, such as norm-following or non-
consequentialism, often involves context-regarding motivation. (Of course, we do not
claim that context-variance is always boundedly rational or that context-regardingness
is always sophisticated.)
Note that while we take agents to conceptualize options as bundles of motivationally
salient properties, we could not simply define each option as a bundle of motivationally
salient properties. Since an agent may conceptualize the same option in terms of di↵er-
ent properties in di↵erent contexts, we cannot know the agent’s motivationally salient
properties ex ante; they can be inferred, at most, after observing the agent’s choices
(Bhattacharyya, Pattanaik, and Xu 2011 make a similar observation). Moreover, the
same option can have di↵erent properties in di↵erent contexts when the properties are
relational. The same piece of cake can be the second-largest in one context and the
largest in another, and thus “politely choosable” in the former context, but not in the
latter.
In Section 2, we introduce our framework and discuss some examples. In Section 3, we
examine the choice-behavioural implications of the two kinds of context-dependence. In
Section 4, we show how choice behaviour can reveal the motivational salience function
and the fundamental preference relation. In Section 5, we discuss the prediction of
choices in unobserved contexts, a topic neglected in standard choice theory. One of the
messages of this paper is that psychological adequacy in the rationalization of choice
matters greatly for the prediction of an agent’s future choices.
To the best of our knowledge, our framework is novel. There is, of course, a grow-
ing body of works in decision theory o↵ering non-standard approaches to rationaliza-
tion (e.g., Suzumura and Xu 2001; Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler 2002; Manzini and
Mariotti 2007, 2012; Salant and Rubinstein 2008; Bernheim and Rangel 2009; Man-
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dler, Manzini, and Mariotti 2012; Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay 2012; Cherepanov,
Feddersen, and Sandroni 2013), but none of them take the present approach. In the
Appendix, we briefly discuss two conceptually related papers by Bossert and Suzumura
(2009) and Bhattacharyya, Pattanaik, and Xu (2011) about the phenomenon of context-
dependence. Among our contributions is a response to problems identified by them. Our
paper also formalizes a distinction drawn by Rubinstein (2006) between “internal” and
“external” reasons for choice, which parallels our distinction between context-regarding
and context-unregarding motivation. More extensive reviews of the literature can be
found in our philosophical papers on preference formation and preference change (Diet-
rich and List 2013a,b) and in the monograph by Bossert and Suzumura (2010).1
2 A general framework
2.1 Observable primitives
The observable primitives of our framework are the following:
• A non-empty set X of options. Typical elements are x, y, z, ...
• A non-empty set K of contexts. On the classical (“extensional”) definition, each
context K 2 K is a non-empty set K ✓ X of feasible options, which the agent
may choose from. On a more general (“non-extensional”) definition, each context
K 2 K induces a non-empty feasible set [K] ✓ X, but may carry additional
information about the choice environment. Formally, K could be a pair (Y, )
of a feasible set Y (=[K]) and an environmental parameter  , representing a cue,
default, room temperature, background music, or even a state of the agent such
as “sober” or “drunk”. (This resembles a “frame” in Salant and Rubinstein 2008
or “set of ancillary conditions” in Bernheim and Rangel 2009.) We simply write
K for [K], as it is always unambiguous whether K refers to the context broadly
defined or to the feasible set [K] (e.g., in “x 2 K”, K refers to [K]).
• A choice function C : K! 2X , which assigns to each context K 2 K a non-empty
set of chosen options in K (i.e., C(K) ✓ K).
1Our results here do not overlap with those in Dietrich and List (2013a,b), which did not address the
rationalization of choice. The present paper is the first to discuss reason-based rationalizations of choice
functions, to distinguish two forms of context-dependent choice, to treat motivationally salient properties
not as primitives but as derivable from choice behaviour, and to o↵er a reason-based analysis of choice
prediction. On the logic of preferences, property-based preferences, and preference or attitude change,
see also Liu (2010), Osherson and Weinstein (2012), and Dietrich (2012). For further philosophical
discussions supporting a “reason-based” perspective, see Pettit (1991) and Dietrich and List (2012).
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2.2 Properties
A choice in context K can be viewed as a choice among pairs of the form (x,K), where
x 2 K. We call the elements of X ⇥ K option-context pairs.2 We define properties
as features of option-context pairs. Formally, a property is an abstract object, P , that
picks out a subset [P ] ✓ X⇥K called its extension, consisting of all option-context pairs
that “have” or “satisfy” the property (thus properties are binary). We assume that the
extension of any property is distinct from ? and from X ⇥K. This rules out properties
that are never satisfied or always satisfied.
Our definition allows distinct properties to have the same extension. This is use-
ful for capturing framing e↵ects in which the description of a property matters. For
example, the properties “80% fat-free” and “20% fat” (in foods) have the same exten-
sion but di↵erent descriptions and may sometimes prompt di↵erent responses. In many
applications, however, it su ces to identify properties with their extensions.
We distinguish between three kinds of properties:
Option properties: These are properties whose possession by an option-context pair
depends only on the option, not on the context. Examples are “fat-free” or “vanilla-
flavoured” (in yoghurts). Formally, P is an option property if
(x,K) 2 [P ], (x,K 0) 2 [P ] for all x 2 X and K,K 0 2 K.
Context properties: These are properties whose possession by an option-context pair
depends only on the context, not on the option. Examples are “o↵ering more than one
feasible option”, “o↵ering a Rolls Royce among the feasible options”, and – if contexts
specify the choice environment over and above the feasible set – the time (“it’s evening”),
the temperature (“it’s a hot day”), a default (“such-and-such is the status quo”), or some
other frame. Formally, P is a context property if
(x,K) 2 [P ], (x0,K) 2 [P ] for all x, x0 2 X and K 2 K.
Relational properties: These are properties whose possesion by an option-context
pair depends on both the option and the context, capturing their relationship. Examples
are “not being the largest piece of cake o↵ered” and “being the most expensive car on
the market”. Formally, P is a relational property if it is neither an option property nor
a context property.
2Note that some pairs (x,K) in X ⇥K are “infeasible” in the sense that x /2 K.
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We call properties that are not option properties context-regarding and properties
that are not context properties option-regarding. Relational properties are context-
regarding and option-regarding.
2.3 An example
To illustrate how properties may determine an agent’s choice, we give an example to
which we will refer repeatedly. It concerns the choice of fruit at a dinner party, as in
Sen’s well-known example of a polite dinner-party guest. Let X contain di↵erent fruits:
apples, bananas, chocolate-covered pears, and possibly others. Each kind of fruit comes
in up to three sizes: big, medium, and small. A choice context is a non-empty feasible
set K ✓ X, consisting of fruits currently in the basket. The set of possible contexts is
K = 2X\{?}. We consider the following properties:
• “big”, “medium”, and “small”: the option properties of being a big, medium, and
small fruit, respectively;
• “chocolate-o↵ering”: the context property of o↵ering at least one chocolate-covered
fruit among the feasible options;
• “polite”: the relational property of not being the last available fruit of its kind,
i.e., not being the last apple in the basket, the last banana, and so on.
We describe four agents whose choice behaviour we will subsequently explain:
Bon-vivant Bonnie always chooses a largest available fruit. For any K, she chooses
C(K) = {x 2 K : x is largest in K},
where “medium” is larger than “small”, and “big” is larger than both other sizes.
Polite Pauline politely avoids choosing the last available fruit of its kind and only
secondarily cares about a fruit’s size. For any K, she chooses
C(K) = {x 2 K : x is largest in K⇤ if K⇤ 6= ? and largest in K if K⇤ = ?},
where K⇤ is the set of all fruits in K that are not the last available ones of their kind.
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Chocoholic Coco picks any fruit indi↵erently when no chocolate-covered fruit is avail-
able, but otherwise chooses a largest available fruit, because the smell of chocolate makes
him hungry. For any K, he chooses
C(K) =
(
K if Kcontains no chocolate-covered fruit,
{x 2 K : x is largest in K} otherwise.
Weak-willed William makes the same polite choices as Pauline when no chocolate-
covered fruit is available, and the same “greedy” choices as Bonnie otherwise, as the
smell of chocolate makes him lose his inhibitions. For any K, he chooses
C(K) =
8><>: {x 2 K : x is largest in K
⇤} if
"
Kcontains no chocolate-covered fruit
and K⇤ 6= ?
#
,
{x 2 K : x is largest in K} otherwise,
where K⇤ is again the set of fruits in K that are not the last available ones of their kind.
2.4 Reason-based models
To explain an agent’s choices, we consider a set P of potentially relevant properties,
called a property system. It contains the properties we have at our disposal for any
rationalization. In our example, P = {big, medium, small, chocolate-o↵ering, polite}.
The specification of P may depend on our explanatory goals. The slimmer P is, the
fewer patterns of choice can be explained. The set P can be partitioned into the sets
Poption, Pcontext, and Prelational of option properties, context properties, and relational
properties, respectively. For any option x and any context K, we write
• P(x,K) for the set {P 2 P : (x,K) 2 [P ]} of all properties of the pair (x,K),
• P(x) = P(x,K) \ Poption for the set of option properties of x, and
• P(K) = P(x,K) \ Pcontext for the set of context properties of K.
Each of these three sets is assumed to be finite (while X, K, and P need not be finite).
A subset of P is called a property bundle.
We define a reason-based model of an agent, M, as a pair (M, ) consisting of:
• Amotivational salience function M (formally a function from K into 2P), which as-
signs to each contextK 2 K a setM(K) ofmotivationally salient properties in con-
text K. We require that any contexts with the same context properties induce the
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same motivationally salient properties, i.e., if P(K)=P(K 0) then M(K)=M(K 0).
(So di↵erences in motivation must stem from di↵erences in context properties.)
• A fundamental preference relation   over property bundles (formally a binary
relation on 2P , on which we initially impose no restrictions). We write > and ⌘
for the strict and indi↵erence relations induced by  .
Informally, M specifies which properties the agent cares about in each context, and
  specifies how he cares about these properties, by ranking di↵erent property bundles
relative to one another.
The modelM represents (i) how the agent conceptualizes options in each context, (ii)
what his resulting preferences over the options are, and (iii) what choices he is disposed
to make. Formally:
• Any option x is conceptualized in context K as the set of motivationally salient
properties of (x,K), denoted xK = P(x,K) \M(K).
• The agent’s preference relation in contextK is the binary relation %K onX defined
as follows:
x %K y , xK   yK for all x, y 2 X.
We write  K and ⇠K for the strict and indi↵erence relations induced by %K .
• The agent’s choice dispositions are given by the function CM : K ! 2X which
assigns to each context the set of most preferred feasible options in that context:
CM(K) = {x 2 K : x %K y for all y 2 K}.
This defines an improper choice function (“improper” because CM(K) may be
empty for some K if   is not well-behaved).
A choice function C : K ! 2X is reason-based rationalizable (relative to P) if there
exists a reason-based model M (relative to P) such that C = CM. We then call M a
rationalization of C.
The fact that reason-based rationalizations depend on the property system P does
not render them ad hoc. To the contrary, by introducing properties we can express
hypotheses about how an agent conceptualizes and individuates the options. Classical
choice theory treats options as exogenously given. In e↵ect, the classical specification of
the options also encodes a hypothesis about how options are individuated, though less
transparently so. Thus our framework allows us to make explicit an issue that is largely
neglected in classical choice theory.
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2.5 Revisiting the example
The four choice functions in our example are all reason-based rationalizable:
Bon-vivant Bonnie’s choice function can be rationalized by defining the set of
motivationally salient properties in any context K as
M(K) = {big, medium, small} (so M is a constant function),
and defining the fundamental preference relation  such that the three singleton property
bundles {big}, {medium}, and {small} stand in the linear order satisfying
{big} > {medium} > {small}.3
For instance, in a context K that o↵ers only a small apple a and a big banana b, Bonnie
chooses the banana b. She conceptualizes the two fruits as
aK = P(a,K) \M(K) = {small},
bK = P(b,K) \M(K) = {big},
and bK %K aK since {big} > {small}.
Polite Pauline’s choice function can be rationalized by defining the set of motiva-
tionally salient properties in any context K as
M(K) = {big, medium, small, polite} (so, again, M is a constant function),
and defining the fundamental preference relation   such that the property bundles
{big, polite}, {medium, polite}, {small, polite}, {big}, {medium} and {small} stand in
the linear order satisfying
{big, polite} > {medium, polite} > {small, polite} > {big} > {medium} > {small}.
3Formally,   = {({big},{big}), ({big},{medium}), ({big},{small}), ({medium},{medium}),
({medium},{small}), ({small},{small})}.
9
For instance, if only two small apples a and a0 and one big banana b are available in
context K, Pauline chooses an apple. She conceptualizes the three fruits as
aK = P(a,K) \M(K) = {small, polite},
a0K = P(a0,K) \M(K) = {small, polite},
bK = P(b,K) \M(K) = {big},
where aK ⇠K a0K %K bK since {small, polite} ⌘ {small, polite} > {big}.
Chocoholic Coco’s choice function can be rationalized by defining the set of mo-
tivationally salient properties in any context K as
M(K) =
8>>>><>>>>:
? if no chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
i.e., chocolate-o↵ering /2 P(K),
{big, medium, if a chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
small} i.e., chocolate-o↵ering 2 P(K),
and defining the fundamental preference relation   as in Bonnie’s case, with the only
additional stipulation that ? ⌘ ?. For instance, in a context without a tempting
chocolate-covered fruit, he picks any fruit indi↵erently, because he conceptualizes every
fruit as the same empty property bundle ?, where ? ⌘ ?.
Weak-willed William’s choice function can be rationalized by defining the set of
motivationally salient properties in any context K as
M(K) =
8>>>><>>>>:
{big, medium, if no chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
small, polite} i.e., chocolate-o↵ering /2 P(K),
{big, medium, if a chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
small} i.e., chocolate-o↵ering 2 P(K),
and defining the fundamental preference relation   as in Pauline’s case. So, if context
K o↵ers only two small apples a and a0 and one big banana b, then, undisturbed by any
smell of chocolate, he conceptualizes these fruits as Pauline does and politely chooses a
small apple. If a small chocolate-covered pear is added to the basket, he forgets about
politeness and conceptualizes the fruits as Bonnie does, choosing the big banana.
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2.6 Two kinds of context-dependent motivation
In our example, Polite Pauline and Chocoholic Coco are a↵ected by the context in
opposite ways. Pauline cares about the context, since the relational property “polite” is
motivationally salient for her. Coco’s set of motivationally salient properties varies with
the context: di↵erent contexts make him care about di↵erent properties. We say that
an agent’s motivation, according to model M = (M, ), is
• context-regarding if the range of the motivational salience function M includes not
only sets of option properties (i.e., M(K) contains at least one context-regarding
property for some K 2 K), and context-unregarding otherwise;
• context-variant if M is a non-constant function (i.e., M(K) is not the same for all
K 2 K), and context-invariant otherwise.
How do the two kinds of context-dependence a↵ect the agent’s conceptualization of the
options in each context? Table 1 shows how the agent conceptualizes any option x in
context K, depending on which of the two kinds of context-dependence are present.
Context-variant motivation?
Yes No
Context-regarding
motivation?
Yes
xK = P(x,K) \M(K)
(e.g., William)
xK = P(x,K) \M
(e.g., Pauline)
No
xK = P(x) \M(K)
(e.g., Coco)
xK = P(x) \M
(e.g., Bonnie)
Table 1: The agent’s conceptualization of option x in context K
Note that, with both kinds of context-dependence permitted, option x is concep-
tualized in context K as xK = P(x,K) \ M(K), which may depend on the context
in two places: (i) in the set of properties of the option-context pair (x,K) and (ii) in
the set of motivationally salient properties in context K. If the agent’s motivation is
context-unregarding, P(x,K) can be replaced by P(x). Here, M(K) contains only op-
tion properties, so that P(x,K) \M(K) = P(x) \M(K). If the agent’s motivation is
context-invariant,M(K) can be replaced by a single setM of motivationally salient prop-
erties. Here, M is a constant function, so that the first component of the reason-based
model (M, ) can be redefined as a fixed set M . In the case of no context-dependence,
the agent’s conceptualization of option x in any context K simplifies to xK = P(x)\M .
From a classical perspective, agents with context-invariant motivation seem more
rational than agents whose motivation varies as a result of subtle environmental fea-
tures like the smell of chocolate. Bonnie exemplifies the case of classical rationality:
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context-invariant motivation and context-unregarding conceptualization of the options.
Pauline displays sophisticated rational behaviour: she considers not only properties of
the options, but also properties concerning the relationship between options and con-
text, such as politeness. William tries to display the same sophisticated behaviour, but
is susceptible to variations in motivation across di↵erent contexts. Coco, finally, focuses
only on option properties, but, like William, lacks a stable motivation.
2.7 Some illustrative non-classical choice behaviours
To illustrate the generality of this framework, we briefly show how it can represent
framing e↵ects, choices by heuristics or checklists, and non-consequentialist choices.
Framing e↵ects: Framing e↵ects can be understood as special kinds of choice rever-
sals. A choice reversal occurs when there are contexts K and K 0 and options x and
y such that x is chosen over y in K and y is chosen over x in K 0, where at least one
choice is strict. (Option x is chosen weakly over option y in context K if x, y 2 K and
x 2 C(K); and strictly if, in addition, y /2 C(K).) Choice reversals can have two sources,
according to a reason-based rationalization of C. The source is context-variance if K
and K 0 induce di↵erent sets of motivationally salient propertiesM(K) 6=M(K 0) both of
which contain only option properties. The source is context-regardingness if K and K 0
induce the same set M(K) = M(K 0), but this set contains some relational or context
properties that distinguish the choice between x and y in the two contexts. (There are
also mixed cases.) In either case, the agent prefers x to y as conceptualized in context K,
and y to x as conceptualized in context K 0, as illustrated in Figure 1. We may define a
Figure 1: A choice reversal
framing e↵ect as a choice reversal whose source is context-variance, and define the frame
in each context K as the set of context properties P(K) “responsible” for M(K). (In
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Section 5, we introduce a notion of causally relevant context properties that could be
used to refine this definition.) Whether a choice reversal counts as a framing e↵ect then
depends on the reason-based model by which we rationalize C. Note that, if K and K 0
o↵er the same feasible options, framing e↵ects can occur only if contexts are defined non-
extensionally, as consisting of both a feasible set and an environmental parameter (as in
Salant and Rubinstein 2008); otherwise M(K) and M(K 0) would have to coincide. If K
and K 0 o↵er di↵erent feasible options, framing e↵ects can occur even when contexts are
defined extensionally, provided they are distinguished by some context properties (such
as “o↵ering luxury goods”) that lead to the di↵erence between M(K) and M(K 0).
Checklists or “take-the-best” heuristics: Here, the agent considers a list of criteria
by which the options can be distinguished and places the criteria in some order of
importance. For any set of feasible options, the agent first compares the options in terms
of the first criterion; if there are ties, he moves on to the second criterion; if there are still
ties, he moves on to the third; and so on. Gigerenzer et al. (e.g., 2000) describe empirical
examples of such choice procedures, and Mandler, Manzini, and Mariotti (e.g., 2012) o↵er
a formal analysis (see also Liu 2010). In our framework, we can rationalize such choice
behaviour by a reason-based model (M, ) with a lexicographic fundamental preference
relation  , where property bundles are ranked on the basis of some order of importance
over properties. To illustrate, let P1, P2, P3, ... denote the first, second, third, ...,
properties in this order (assuming a finite P). We can then define the fundamental
preference relation   as follows: for any property bundles S1 and S2, let S1   S2 if
and only if either S1 = S2 or there is some n such that (i) Pn 2 S1, (ii) Pn /2 S2, and
(iii) S1 \ {P1, ..., Pn 1} = S2 \ {P1, ..., Pn 1}. A lexicographic fundamental preference
relation can be combined with either context-variant or context-invariant motivation,
and with either context-regarding or context-unregarding motivation. This opens up
greater generality than usually acknowledged.
Non-consequentialism: A non-consequentialist agent, in the most general sense,
makes a choice in a given context not just on the basis of the chosen option itself (the
“outcome”), but also on the basis of what the choice context is or how each option relates
to that context (the “act of choosing the option”). Any context-regarding motivation
can thus be viewed as a form of non-consequentialism. More narrowly, we may consider
an agent who cares about whether each option is “permissible” or “norm-conforming” in
a given context. The relevant criterion may be, for example, politeness, legality, or moral
permissibility in the context. Let us introduce a relational property P such that any
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option-context pair (x,K) satisfies P if and only if the choice of x is deemed permissible
or norm-conforming in contextK. If P is in everyM(K) and the fundamental preference
relation ranks property bundles that include P above bundles that do not, the agent will
always choose a permissible or norm-conforming option, unless no such option is feasible.
Note that this could not generally be modelled without context-regarding motivation.
For earlier discussions of non-consequentialist and “norm-conditional” choices, see, e.g.,
Suzumura and Xu (2001) and Bossert and Suzumura (2009).
3 Choice-behavioural implications
When does a choice function C : K! 2X have a reason-based rationalization? We first
give necessary and su cient conditions for reason-based rationalizability without any
restriction, permitting both context-variant and context-regarding motivation. We then
characterize the opposite case, without any context-dependence. Finally, we address the
two intermediate cases, where rationalizability is restricted to either context-invariant
or context-unregarding motivation but not both. The reader may skip this section if he
or she is interested primarily in constructing reason-based models from observed choices
(Section 4) or in predicting choices in novel contexts (Section 5).
3.1 Reason-based rationalizability without any restriction
We begin by stating two axioms which, together, imply that choice is based on properties.
The first is an “intra-context” axiom. It states that the agent’s choice in any context
does not distinguish between options that have the same properties in that context:
Axiom 1 For all contexts K 2 K and all options x, y 2 K, if P(x,K) = P(y,K), then
x 2 C(K), y 2 C(K).
The second axiom is an “inter-context” axiom. It states that if two contexts o↵er
the same feasible property bundles, the agent chooses options instantiating the same
property bundles in those contexts:
Axiom 2 For all contexts K,K 0 2 K, if {P(x,K) : x 2 K} = {P(x,K 0) : x 2 K 0}, then
{P(x,K) : x 2 C(K)} = {P(x,K 0) : x 2 C(K 0)}.
This is weaker than requiring that the same options be chosen in those contexts.
The axiom further requires no relationship between the choices in contexts K and K 0
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with di↵erent context properties (i.e., P(K) 6= P(K 0)), since these automatically o↵er
di↵erent feasible property bundles.
Axioms 1 and 2 do not by themselves imply any maximizing behaviour.4 This gap
is filled by our third axiom, a variant of Richter’s (1971) axiom of “revelation coher-
ence” (which, in turn, is a weakening of the weak axiom of revealed preference; see,
e.g., Samuelson 1948). Unlike Richter, we formulate our axiom at the level of property
bundles, not options. We adapt some revealed-preference terminology. For any property
bundles S and S0:
• S is feasible in context K if S = P(x,K) for some feasible option x 2 K;
• S is chosen in context K if S = P(x,K) for some option x 2 C(K);
• S is revealed weakly preferred to S0 (formally S %C S0) if, in some context, S is
chosen while S0 is feasible; S is revealed strictly preferred to S0 if, in some context,
S is chosen while S0 is feasible and not chosen.5
Axiom 3 If a property bundle S ✓ P is feasible in some context K 2 K and is revealed
weakly preferred to every feasible property bundle in context K, then S is chosen in
context K.
Like Axiom 2, Axiom 3 is less restrictive than one might think. For the choices in
context K to constrain those in context K 0, the two contexts must have the same context
properties, i.e., P(K) = P(K 0). Otherwise there will be no property bundles that are
feasible in both K and K 0. In fact:
Lemma 1 Axiom 3 strengthens Axiom 2.
Theorem 1 A choice function C is reason-based rationalizable if and only if it satisfies
Axioms 1 and 3 (and by implication 2).6
4They are jointly equivalent to choice being rationalizable by a generalized reason-based model, defined
by (i) a motivational salience function and (ii) a choice function defined on property bundles, not on
options (which is more general than a fundamental preference relation   over property bundles).
5One must not interpret the revealed-preference relation %C as representing the agent’s fundamental
preferences. When the agent revealed-prefers bundle S to bundle S0 by choosing S over S0 in some
context, only some subsets of S and S0 are usually motivationally salient, and the fundamental preference
is held between these, not between S and S0. In Section 4, we introduce a notion of revealed fundamental
preference. The revealed-preference relation %C between property bundles induces a context-variant
revealed-preference relation %CK between options: option x is revealed weakly preferred to option y in
context K (x %CK y) if and only if P(x,K) %C P(y,K). In classical choice theory, without the resources
of properties, it is hard to define an interesting notion of context-variant revealed preference. Classical
revealed preferences are context-invariant and fail to rationalize many observable choice behaviours.
6Axioms 1 and 3 are jointly equivalent to the requirement that, for every K 2 K and every x 2 K, if
P(x,K) is revealed weakly preferred to P(y,K) for every y 2 K, then x 2 C(K).
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This result, like all subsequent results, holds for each property system P. We can
thus test for rationalizability in di↵erent property systems, e.g., by asking: Is the agent’s
choice between cars rationalizable in a system of colour-related properties? In a system
of prestige-related properties? In a system of prestige- and price-related properties?7
Reason-based rationalizations need not be unique. For a given choice function C,
there may exist more than one reason-based model M such that C = CM. Di↵erent
rationalizations are far from equivalent, as discussed in detail later. They may lead to
di↵erent predictions for novel choice contexts outside the set K of “observed” contexts, as
shown in Section 5. We now reduce and later (in Section 4) eliminate the non-uniqueness
of M, by imposing additional restrictions on the admissible reason-based models.
3.2 Reason-based rationalizability without any context-dependence
While we have so far allowed rationalizations to display both kinds of context-dependence,
we now consider the opposite, limiting case with no context-dependence at all. Con-
sider the following variants of Axioms 1 and 2, obtained by referring only to context-
unregarding properties:
Axiom 1* For all contexts K 2 K and all options x, y 2 K, if P(x) = P(y), then
x 2 C(K), y 2 C(K).
Axiom 2* For all contexts K,K 0 2 K, if {P(x) : x 2 K} = {P(x) : x 2 K 0}, then
{P(x) : x 2 C(K)} = {P(x) : x 2 C(K 0)}.
In our example, Bon-vivant Bonnie satisfies both axioms; Chocoholic Coco satisfies
Axiom 1* but violates Axiom 2* (to see this, suppose K contains a chocolate-covered
pear whileK 0 does not); and Polite Pauline and Weak-willed William violate even Axiom
1* (they care about a relational property).
We also introduce an analogue of Axiom 3, namely Richter’s (1971) original ax-
iom of revelation coherence, extended to our framework where contexts (if defined non-
extensionally) can be more general than feasible sets.
Axiom 3* For all contexts K 2 K and any feasible option x 2 K, if, for every option
y 2 K, there is a context K 0 2 K in which x is chosen weakly over y, then x 2 C(K).
7To make this explicit, we could restate Theorem 1 (and similarly other results) as follows: For every
property system P, a choice function C is reason-based rationalizable in P if and only if it satisfies
Axioms 1 and 3 (and thereby 2).
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To state our characterization of reason-based rationalizability without any context-
dependence, call the set of contexts K closed under cloning if K is closed under trans-
forming any context by adding “clones” of feasible options; formally, whenever a context
K 2 K contains an option x such that P(x) = P(x0) for another option x0 2 X (a clone
of x), there is a context K 0 2 K such that K 0 = K [ {x0}. This is a weak condition.8
Theorem 2 Given a set of contexts K that is closed under cloning, a choice function C
is reason-based rationalizable with context-invariant and context-unregarding motivation
if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1*, 2*, and 3*.
In fact, Axiom 3* alone is equivalent to rationalizability of choice by a binary rela-
tion over options, as is well-known in the classical case where contexts are feasible sets
(Richter 1971 and Bossert and Suzumura 2010).
Remark 1 A choice function C satisfies Axiom 3* if and only if it is rationalizable by
a preference relation, i.e., there is a binary relation % on X such that for all contexts
K 2 K,
C(K) = {x 2 K : x % y for all y 2 K}.
This, however, is not a reason-based rationalization, and to obtain such a rational-
ization, our additional axioms, 1* and 2*, are needed, as Theorem 2 shows.
3.3 Reason-based rationalizability with either context-unregarding or
context-invariant motivation
We finally turn to reason-based rationalizability with one but not both kinds of context-
dependence. We begin with the case in which the agent’s motivation can be context-
variant, but not context-regarding. The axioms characterizing this case lie logically
between (i) Axioms 1*, 2*, and 3*, which characterize reason-based rationalizability
without any context-dependence (Theorem 2), and (ii) Axioms 1, 2, and 3, which char-
acterize reason-based rationalizability simpliciter (Theorem 1). Specifically, they are
Axioms 1* and 3 and a new axiom that weakens Axiom 2* in the presence of 1*. We
omit the details here, since the new axiom has a complex form.
8It holds vacuously if no two distinct options in X have the same properties, i.e., for any x, x0 2 X,
x 6= x0 implies P(x) 6= P(x0). The condition is also natural because if an option x0 is property-wise
indistinguishable from a currently feasible option x, one would expect that x0 can become feasible too.
Presumably, if x, but not x0, can be feasible (together with some other options), this di↵erence stems
from x and x0 having di↵erent properties. We could further weaken or modify the condition, e.g., by
replacing “K0 = K [ {x0}” with “K0 = (K\{x : P(x) = P(x0)}) [ {x0}”, so that x0 is not added but
substituted for the existing feasible options that are property-wise indistinguishable from it.
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Now consider the case of context-invariant but possibly context-regarding motiva-
tion, which subsumes sophisticated rational behaviour, as illustrated by Polite Pauline.
Surprisingly, the conditions characterizing this case are the same as those characterizing
reason-based rationalizability without any restrictions. Thus, any choice behaviour that
is reason-based rationalizable also has a rationalization with context-invariant motiva-
tion. Although this suggests that the restriction to context-invariance has no choice-
behaviourial implications, we show in Section 5 that this impression is misleading. The
restriction to context-invariance can a↵ect the prediction of choices in novel contexts.
Before stating the present result formally, let us give an illustration. As we have
seen, Chocoholic Coco can be rationalized by a reason-based model with context-variant
motivation. This captures our informal description of Coco’s behaviour. However, a
less intuitive rationalization is also possible. It ascribes context-invariant motivation
to Coco, at the expense of making this motivation context-regarding. This alternative
model (M, ) is the following:
• M assigns to each context the same set of motivationally salient properties M =
{big, medium, small, chocolate-o↵ering}, instead of letting motivationally salient
properties vary with the presence or absence of chocolate;
•   places any property bundles that do not contain the property “chocolate-o↵ering”
in the same indi↵erence class (e.g., {big} ⌘ {small}), and ranks property bun-
dles by size when they contain one of the size properties together with the prop-
erty “chocolate-o↵ering” (e.g., {big, chocolate-o↵ering} > {medium, chocolate-
o↵ering} > {small, chocolate-o↵ering}).
Generally, two reason-based models M and M0 are behaviourally equivalent if they
induce the same (possibly improper) choice function, i.e., if CM = CM0 .
Proposition 1 Every reason-based model is behaviourally equivalent to one with context-
invariant motivation.
Corollary 1 A choice function C has a reason-based rationalization with context-
invariant motivation if and only if it has a reason-based rationalization simpliciter.
The possibility of re-modelling any reason-based rationalization in a context-invariant
way disappears once we impose further requirements onM, such as the requirement that
motivation be context-unregarding or that it be “revealed”, as discussed in Section 4.9
As a consequence of Proposition 1, Theorem 1 can be re-stated as a characterization of
context-invariant reason-based choice:
9Even when this re-modelling is possible, it may sacrifice parsimony and psychological adequacy, as
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Theorem 3 A choice function C is reason-based rationalizable with context-invariant
motivation if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1 and 3 (and by implication 2).
3.4 Criteria for selecting a rationalization in cases of non-uniqueness
How can we select a reason-based model (M, ) in cases of non-uniqueness?10 This
question matters because di↵erent models attribute to the agent di↵erent cognitive pro-
cesses, which may di↵er in psychological adequacy and lead to di↵erent predictions for
the agent’s future choices, as discussed in Section 5. There are at least three kinds of
criteria for selecting a model.
Revelation criteria: These require that, as far as possible:
(i) the motivational salience function M deem only those properties motivationally
salient that make an observable di↵erence to the agent’s choice behaviour, and
(ii) the fundamental preference relation   over property bundles be systematically de-
rived from the agent’s choice behaviour.
The goal is to minimize behaviourally ungrounded ascriptions of motivation and funda-
mental preference. This is the topic of Section 4.
Non-choice data: Verbal reports or neurophysiological data, such as responses to
property-related stimuli, may help us test hypotheses about
(i) which properties are motivationally salient for the agent in context K and thus
belong to M(K),
(ii) which context properties causally a↵ect motivational salience, so that M(K) may
vary as contexts K vary in those properties, and
(iii) which property bundles the agent fundamentally prefers to which others.
evident from the proof of Proposition 1. Here, every property that was motivationally salient in some
context in the original, context-variant model (M, ) and every context property (at least every context
property on which M(K) may depend) becomes motivationally salient in the new, context-invariant
model (M⇤, ⇤), with M⇤ constant. Formally, ([K2KM(K)) [ Pcontext ✓M⇤.
10Non-uniqueness in the rationalization of choice behaviour is familiar from classical choice theory,
where the same choice function can often be rationalized by more than one binary relation over the
options. The relation becomes unique if the domain of the choice function (i.e., the set of contexts in
which choice is observed) is “rich”, i.e., contains all sets of one or two options.
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One might hypothesize that people have better conscious access to how they conceptu-
alize the options in a given context K and therefore to the properties in M(K) than
to the context properties that a↵ect what M(K) is (i.e., those properties which, in an
empirical study, might be significant explanatory variables for M). Some changes in
M(K) might be due to subconscious influences, as in framing or nudging e↵ects. If so,
verbal reports may be more relevant to questions (i) and (iii) than to question (ii).
Parsimony criteria: We may try to select a parsimonious model (M, ), where
(i) the sets M(K) of motivationally salient properties generated by M are (a) as small
as possible and (b) as unchanging as possible across di↵erent K, and
(ii) the relation   is as sparse as possible (e.g., defined over the fewest possible property
bundles).
There may be a trade-o↵ between di↵erent dimensions of parsimony. If the sets M(K)
contain only few properties, they may not be stable across di↵erentK, and vice versa. As
the proof of Proposition 1 shows, we can always achieve context-invariance by definingM
constantly as the entire set P and the fundamental preference relation   as the revealed
preference relation %C over property bundles. This makes the sets M(K) unchanging
but very large, and hence perhaps psychologically implausible. Conversely, making each
M(K) small might require variation across contexts.
4 The revealed reason-based model
A familiar concept from classical choice theory is the revealed preference relation over
options, which can be inferred from the agent’s choice behaviour. Analogously, we now
introduce the revealed reason-based model, which can be inferred from the observed
choice function. It is constructed by
• counting a property as motivationally salient in a given context if and only if it
makes a behavioural di↵erence (in a sense defined below), and
• counting a property bundle S as fundamentally preferred to another bundle T if
and only if the agent chooses an option x over another option y, where x and y
are revealed to be conceptualized as S and T (in a sense defined below).
We first define the revealed reason-based model and then characterize the class of choice
functions that are rationalizable by such a model.
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4.1 Revealed motivationally salient properties
Our strategy for determining whether a property P is motivationally salient for an agent
in context K is to ask whether its presence or absence in an option makes a di↵erence
to his choice in contexts “like” K, i.e., contexts K 0 with the same context properties
as K (where P(K 0)=P(K)). Choices in contexts with di↵erent context properties are
irrelevant, since they could stem from di↵erent motivationally salient properties. The
choice of moisturizer over sunscreen in a cloudy context is no evidence for whether
“protecting against UV radiation” is motivationally salient in a context with sunshine.
To formalize these ideas, we begin with some preliminary terminology. Two property
bundles agree on a property P 2 P if both or neither contain P ; otherwise, they di↵er
in P . A property bundle S is weakly between two property bundles T and T 0 if S agrees
with each of T and T 0 on every property on which they agree. If, in addition, S is
distinct from each of T and T 0, then S is strictly between T and T 0. For instance, {P,Q}
is strictly between {P} and {Q}, as is ?. Two property bundles are revealed comparable
if one of them is chosen in some context K while the other is feasible. Two such bundles
di↵er minimally if there is no property bundle that is strictly between them and revealed
comparable to at least one of them.
One might think that a property P is motivationally salient in context K if and only
if there is a context K 0 with the same context properties as K in which the agent reveals
a strict preference between two property bundles that di↵er in P . But this criterion is
inadequate, because the two bundles may also di↵er in other properties. The agent may
choose the larger of two T-shirts, not because it is larger, but because it is blue. So,
before we can infer that P is motivationally salient, we must verify that the two property
bundles di↵er minimally. This suggests the following criterion.
Criterion 1 Property P is revealed motivationally salient in context K if there exist
property bundles S and S0 such that
(rev1) S and S0 di↵er in P ,
(rev2) S is revealed strictly preferred to S0 or vice versa, where the contexts in which
S and S0 are feasible have the same context properties as K (i.e., S \ Pcontext =
S0 \ Pcontext = P(K)), and
(rev3) S and S0 di↵er minimally.
However, this criterion excludes some natural cases. Suppose, again, the options are
T-shirts, and P is the property of largeness. If every context o↵ers either only large T-
shirts or only small ones, P cannot satisfy Criterion 1, since no revealed comparable sets
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S and S0 ever satisfy (rev2). But suppose that whenever only large T-shirts are available
the agent chooses the darkest, and whenever only small T-shirts are available he chooses
the lightest. If there are no context properties in P by which we could distinguish those
contexts further and to which we could attribute the behavioural di↵erence, it is natural
to conclude that property P is motivationally salient. This is because the agent’s choice
between two property bundles containing the property “large” (a large dark T-shirt and
a large light one) is reversed when we remove that property from them (so that we are
now comparing a small dark T-shirt and a small light one). These considerations suggest
the following more general criterion, by which we define revealed motivational salience.
Criterion 2 Property P is revealed motivationally salient in context K if there exist
two pairs of property bundles (S, T ) and (S0, T 0) such that
(REV1) the two pairs di↵er in P , i.e., S and S0 di↵er in P , or T and T 0 di↵er in P ,
(REV2) S is revealed preferred to T while T 0 is revealed preferred to S0 or vice versa
(with at least one preference strict), where the contexts in which S and T , or S0
and T 0, are feasible have the same context properties as K (i.e., S \ Pcontext =
S0 \ Pcontext = T \ Pcontext = T 0 \ Pcontext = P(K)), and
(REV3) the pair (S, T ) di↵ers minimally from the pair (S0, T 0), i.e., there is no other
pair (S00, T 00) (with S00 revealed comparable to T 00) such that S00 is weakly between
S and S0 and T 00 is weakly between T and T 0.
In our example, S and T could be the property bundles instantiated by the large dark
T-shirt and the large light T-shirt, and S0 and T 0 the bundles instantiated by the small
dark T-shirt and the small light T-shirt, respectively.
Proposition 2 Criterion 2 generalizes Criterion 1, i.e., for any context K 2 K, any
property P 2 P that satisfies (rev1)-(rev3) (for some S, S0 ✓ P) also satisfies (REV1)-
(REV3) (for some S, S0, T, T 0 ✓ P).
Our definition of revealed motivational salience has the following natural implication:
Lemma 2 (informal statement) The revealed preference between any two revealed com-
parable property bundles S and T (i.e., whether S %C T ) depends only on
• the context properties within S and T (these determine the contexts K in which S
and T are feasible), and
• the properties within S and T that are revealed motivationally salient in such con-
texts K.
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4.2 The revealed reason-based model
We can now complete our definition of the revealed reason-based model. The revealed
motivational salience function is the function MC (from K into 2P) satisfying:
for each context K, MC(K) = {P 2 P : P is revealed motivationally salient in K}.
To illustrate, the revealed motivational salience functions of the four agents in our exam-
ple above – Bonnie, Pauline, Coco, and William – are precisely the motivational salience
functions that we used to rationalize their choices.11
Given the function MC , any option x is revealed conceptualized in context K as
xCK = P(x,K) \MC(K).
We define a property bundle S to be revealed weakly fundamentally preferred to another
property bundle T , denoted S  C T , if, in some context K 2 K, there are feasible
options x and y, revealed conceptualized as xCK = S and y
C
K = T , such that x 2 C(K).
The model (MC , C) is called the revealed reason-based model. It can be checked
that the reason-based models that we used to rationalize the four agents in our example
are indeed the revealed models. By considering the revealed model for an agent, we
can behaviourally determine which, if any, of the two kinds of context-dependence are
present in the agent’s motivation. In our example, Coco and William have revealed
context-variant motivation, while Bonnie and Pauline do not; and Pauline and William
have revealed context-regarding motivation, while Bonnie and Coco do not.
4.3 Rationalizability by the revealed model
Is every reason-based rationalizable choice function also rationalizable by the revealed
model? Recall that reason-based rationalizability simpliciter requires Axioms 1 and 3
(which, in turn, imply Axiom 2). For rationalizability by the revealed model, we must
strengthen these axioms by adding the following variant of Axiom 2.
11For instance, for Bonnie, to show that big2MC(K) for any K without chocolate-covered pears,
check (rev1)-(rev3) for S={big} and S0={medium}; to show that big2MC(K) for any K with chocolate-
covered pears, check (rev1)-(rev3) for S={big,chocolate-o↵ering} and S0={medium,chocolate-o↵ering}.
For Pauline, to show that polite2MC(K) for any K without chocolate-covered pears, check (rev1)-(rev3)
for S={big,polite} and S0={big}; to show this for any K with chocolate-covered pears, check (rev1)-
(rev3) for S={big,polite,chocolate-o↵ering} and S0={big,chocolate-o↵ering}. Strictly speaking, the sets
MC(K) take this form ifX is su ciently rich, i.e., contains fruits instantiating relevant property bundles.
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Axiom 2** For all contexts K,K 0 2 K, if {xCK : x 2 K} = {xCK0 : x 2 K 0}, then
{xCK : x 2 C(K)} = {xCK0 : x 2 C(K 0)}.
Our theorem requires a technical condition. Call the set K of contexts rich if, when-
ever two property bundles S and T are simultaneously feasible in some context in K,
then K contains a context in which only S and T are feasible.
Theorem 4 Given a rich set of contexts K, a choice function C is rationalizable by the
revealed reason-based model (MC , C) if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1, 2**, and 3.12
Surprisingly, Theorem 4 does not explicitly require the following variant of Axiom 1.
Axiom 1** For all contexts K 2 K and all options x, y 2 K, if xCK = yCK , then
x 2 C(K), y 2 C(K).
Lemma 3 Axioms 1 and 1** are equivalent.
To see that rationalizability by the revealed model is more demanding than reason-
based rationalizability simpliciter, we give an example.13 Suppose the options are elec-
toral candidates, and the contexts are elections. Let K = {K1,K2}, and consider an
agent who in context K1 votes for any candidate with the (option) property “expe-
rienced” (say, over 20 years of political experience) and in context K2 votes for any
candidate with the (option) property “young” (say, aged below 50), where candidates of
both kinds are available in both contexts. This choice behaviour can be rationalized by
a reason-based model (M, ) in which M(K1) = {experienced} and M(K2) = {young},
and   satisfies
{experienced} > ? and {young} > ?.
What is the revealed model? Suppose there is a perfect anti-correlation between the
properties “experienced” and “young”: a candidate in X is experienced if and only if he
or she is not young. We then have no choice-behavioural basis for determining whether
12We may further ask whether a given choice function C is rationalizable by a model (MC , ) in
which MC is the revealed motivational salience function but   is unrestricted. In the Appendix, we
prove that, given a rich K, a choice function C is rationalizable by some such model if and only if it
satisfies Axioms 1, 2**, and 3. Further, this model (MC , ) will be essentially identical to the revealed
model (MC , C). Two models (M, ) and (M 0, 0) are essentially identical if (i) M = M 0, and (ii)
the fundamental preference relations   and  0 coincide wherever they are choice-behaviourally relevant
(i.e., S   T , S  0 T for all property bundles S and T such that there are options x and y in some
context K that are conceptualized as P(x,K) \M(K) = S and P(y,K) \M(K) = T , respectively).
13The point that choice may be rationalizable, but not by the revealed model, arises also in classical
choice theory: if we seek to rationalize choice by a complete and transitive preference relation, there may
exist such a rationalization although the revealed preference relation is neither complete nor transitive.
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“experienced” or “young” or both are motivationally salient for our voter in any context:
he might have voted for an experienced candidate in context K1, not because he cares
about (and likes) experience in politicians, but because he cares about (and dislikes)
youth. Formally, both properties are revealed motivationally salient in contexts K1 and
K2. We have MC(K1) =MC(K2) = {experienced, young}.14
It is impossible to rationalize the present choice behaviour by the revealed reason-
based model (MC , C) or any other model of the form (MC , ). According to MC ,
our voter always conceptualizes every candidate either as {experienced} or as {young},
where his choice in context K1 can only be rationalized if {experienced} > {young},
while his choice in context K2 can only be rationalized if {young} > {experienced}. It
is easy to check that the voter’s choice behaviour violates Axiom 2**.15
5 Predicting choices in novel contexts
Standard choice theory is largely silent on how to predict choices in novel, previously
unobserved contexts. In almost every empirical science, we make predictions about fu-
ture (or otherwise unobserved) events, based on past observations. Astronomers predict
future solar eclipses or movements of comets based on past trajectories of the relevant
celestial bodies; epidemiologists predict future epidemics based on past epidemiological
data; and econometricians use past data of the economy to predict its future. Choice
theory is an exception in that predictions and observations are usually taken to be the
same thing: the choice function is the observed and predicted object at once.
Genuine predictions would have to be about choice contexts outside the observed
domain K, perhaps with feasible options outside the set X. If we rationalize choices
simply by a preference relation on X, we have no systematic way of extending this
relation to new options. So, we can make only two rather trivial kinds of predictions:
• Any choice function on a set K of contexts can predict choices when contexts in
K recur in the future. But here the preference relation does no work, since even a
not-yet-rationalized choice function allows us to make the same predictions.
• A preference relation on X might be used to predict choices in contexts outside
K that involve only “old” options from X. In such “slightly novel” contexts, we
14We assume that P contains only the option properties “experienced” and “young” and some context
properties to which the change in motivation from K1 to K2 can be attributed.
15Although {xCK1 :x2K1}={xCK2 :x2K2}={{experienced},{young}}, we have {xCK1 :x2C(K1)} 6={xCK2 :x2C(K2)}, since {xCK1 :x2C(K1)}={{experienced}} and {xCK2 :x2C(K2)}={{young}}.
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would predict that the agent will maximize the same preference relation over the
feasible options.
To introduce a reason-based approach to predictions in genuinely new contexts, we
present a formal framework and explore predictions of more and less conservative kinds.
5.1 A framework for predictions
We take the options in X, the contexts in K, and the choice function C to refer to
previously observed choices, and introduce some further primitives:
• An extended set X+ ◆ X of options, containing additional options the agent might
encounter.
• An extended set K+ ◆ K of contexts, containing additional choice contexts the
agent might encounter. Every “new” context K (in K+\K), like every “old” one
(in K), induces a non-empty set [K] of feasible options. Again, we write K for [K]
when there is no ambiguity. While in “old” contexts only “old” options (in X) are
feasible, in “new” contexts “new” options (in X+\X) can be feasible.
• The agent’s extended choice function C+ on K+. This is an extension of the
observed choice function C (i.e., the restriction of C+ to K coincides with C) and
is interpreted as the “true” choice function, capturing the choices the agent would
make when confronted with the contexts in K+.
Having observed the agent’s choices in the domain K, we wish to predict his choices in
K+. The goal is to predict as much of the “true” choice function C+ as possible. A choice
predictor is a choice function ⇡ on some domain D ✓ K+, where typically K ✓ D ✓ K+.
For each K in D, ⇡(K) is the predicted choice in context K. The predictor is accurate
if it predicts the agent’s choice correctly in all contexts in D, i.e., if ⇡(K) = C+(K) for
all K in D. As noted above, a preference relation on X would only allow us to define
predictors for “old” contexts K 2 K or for “new” contexts K 62 K containing only “old”
options from X. Reason-based rationalizations allow us to go further.
We now assume that the properties in P are defined over the extended set of option-
context pairs X+ ⇥K+ (not just over the pairs in X ⇥K). For any domain of contexts
D ✓ K+, a reason-based model for domain D is defined as before and again denoted
(M, ), but ranges over D instead of K. In particular, M is a function from D into 2P .
Our strategy for defining a choice predictor is the following:
• Take a reason-based model M = (M, ) for the original domain K as given.
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• Extend this to a model M0 = (M 0, ) for some domain D with K ✓ D ✓ K+.
• Define a choice predictor on D as the choice function ⇡ := CM0 induced by the
extended model.
By an extension of the model M = (M, ) to the domain D ◆ K we mean a reason-
based model M0 = (M 0, ) for domain D whose restriction to K is M, i.e., (i) the
restriction of the function M 0 to the subdomain K is M , and (ii) M and M0 use the
same fundamental preference relation  .
5.2 Cautious, semi-courageous, and courageous prediction
We now define three reason-based choice predictors. Each is based on a reason-based
model M = (M, ) by which we have rationalized the agent’s observed choice. (This
could be, for example, the revealed model (MC , C) discussed in Section 4.)
Cautious prediction: The cautious predictor (based on M) is the choice function
⇡ := CM0 induced by the extended model M0 = (M 0, ) whose domain D consists of
every context K 2 K+ such that K o↵ers the same feasible property bundles as some
observed context L 2 K:
{P(x,K) : x 2 K} = {P(x, L) : x 2 L}. (1)
Note that (1) implies P(K) = P(L), so that M(K) must equal M(L). By implication,
the extension M0 of M is uniquely defined.
The cautious predictor makes predictions only for choice contexts that o↵er the same
feasible property bundles as some observed context. This ignores the fact that reason-
based choices depend only on motivationally salient properties. The cautious predictor
cannot predict, for example, Bonnie’s choices from a “new” fruit basket (in K+\K) that
is identical to some “old” basket (in K) in terms of the sizes of available fruit but not
in terms of other, non-salient properties. We now introduce a predictor based not on
entire property bundles but only on bundles of motivationally salient properties.
Semi-courageous prediction: The semi-courageous predictor (based on M) is the
choice function ⇡ := CM0 induced by the extended model M0 = (M 0, ) whose domain
D consists of every context K 2 K+ such that
(i) K has the same context properties as some observed context, i.e., P(K) = P(L) for
some L in K (so that M(K) =M(L)), and
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(ii) the set of options as conceptualized in K (feasible bundles of motivationally salient
properties) is the same as that in some observed context, i.e., {xK : x 2 K} = {xL :
x 2 L0} for some L0 in K.
Note that L and L0 in clauses (i) and (ii) can be distinct. Although the semi-courageous
predictor can predict choices in contexts o↵ering new feasible property bundles, it is still
somewhat restrictive. Clause (i) is often unnecessarily demanding. Its role is to tell us
how we must define M(K), namely as M(L). Sometimes, however, we can infer how to
define M(K) without clause (i). Consider, for example, an agent with context-invariant
motivation (according to M). If we are willing to assume that his motivation remains
context-invariant in new contexts, we can define M(K) as unchanged outside K. This
suggests the following, more general predictor.
Courageous prediction: We begin with a preliminary definition. In a reason-based
model M0 = (M 0, ) for some domain D, we call a context property P causally rele-
vant if its presence or absence in a context can make a di↵erence to the agent’s set of
motivationally salient properties in it, i.e., if there are contexts K,K 0 2 D such that
(cau1) K has property P while K 0 does not (or vice versa),
(cau2) K and K 0 induce di↵erent sets of motivationally salient properties, i.e.,M 0(K) 6=
M 0(K 0),
(cau3) K and K 0 di↵er minimally, i.e., there is no context K 00 2 D whose set of context
properties P(K 00) is strictly between the sets P(K) and P(K 0).16
Let CAUM0 denote the set of causally relevant context properties in model M0.17 Two
things are worth noting. First, in the important special case of context-invariant moti-
vation, no context property is causally relevant. Second, the causally relevant context
properties fully determine the agent’s set of motivationally salient properties. Formally:
Proposition 3 Let M0 = (M 0, ) be any reason-based model (for some domain D of
contexts). Then:
(a) M0 has context-invariant motivation if and only if CAUM0 = ?.
(b) For all K, K 0 in K, if P(K)\CAUM0 = P(K 0)\CAUM0 then M 0(K) =M 0(K 0).
16This clause excludes the possibility that K and K0 di↵er in context properties unrelated to P to
which the di↵erence in motivation between K and K0 could be causally attributed.
17IfM0 is a model with revealed motivation (i.e.,M0 = (MC , )), causal relevance is fully determined
by the observed choice function C, so that we may speak of revealed causal relevance and write CAUC .
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The courageous predictor (based on M) is the choice function ⇡ := CM0 induced by
the extended model M0 = (M 0, ) whose domain D consists of every context K 2 K+
such that
(i*) K has the same causally relevant properties as some observed context, i.e., P(K)\
CAUM = P(L) \ CAUM for some L in K; we then define M(K) as M(L);18 and
(ii) the set of options as conceptualized in K is the same as that in some observed
context, i.e., {xK : x 2 K} = {xL : x 2 L0} for some L0 in K.
Our three predictors are increasingly general:
Remark 2 Given a reason-based rationalization M of the observed choice function C,
(a) the cautious predictor extends the observed choice function C;
(b) the semi-courageous predictor extends the cautious predictor; and
(c) the courageous predictor extends the semi-courageous predictor.19
5.3 When is each choice predictor accurate?
When does each predictor coincide with the true choice function C+ on its domain?
It turns out that the accuracy of each predictor depends on whether certain observed
patterns in the agent’s choices are robust, i.e., continue to hold in contexts outside K.
Theorem 5 Given a reason-based rationalizationM of the observed choice functionC,
(a) the cautious predictor is accurate if the extended choice function C+ is rationalizable
by some reason-based model;
(b) the semi-courageous predictor is accurate if the extended choice function C+ is ra-
tionalizable by some extension of M; and
(c) the courageous predictor is accurate if the extended choice function C+ is rational-
izable by some extension of M with the same causally relevant context properties.
18By Proposition 3, the definition of M(K) does not depend on the choice of L.
19The three predictors could be extended further in analogy to the second route we mentioned for
predictions based on preference relations alone: we could drop the requirement that any context K in D
must o↵er the same feasible property bundles (in the cautious case) or options-as-conceptualized (in the
other cases) as some context in K. The maximal generalization would replace clause (ii) in the definition
of the courageous predictor with the requirement that {xK : x 2 K} has a  -greatest element.
29
Informally, part (a) shows that cautious predictions are accurate if the agent’s choices
are robustly reason-based, i.e., reason-based not just in the observed domain K but also
in the extended domain K+. This seems plausible for agents with some stability in their
choice dispositions. Part (b) shows that semi-courageous predictions are accurate if the
existing model M rationalizes choice robustly: it not only explains the agent’s observed
choices, but can be extended to explain all new choices too. This requires that our
reason-based model for the observed domain K is a portion of a reason-based model for
the extended domain K+. Part (c) shows that courageous predictions are accurate if the
model M rationalizes choice robustly in a stronger sense: its extension to new contexts
requires no additional causally relevant context properties. So, our reason-based model
for Kmust be a portion of a reason-based model for the extended domain K+ that already
identifies all causally relevant context properties. Whether these robustness assumptions
are justified depends, in part, on how rich the domain K of observed contexts is relative
to the target domain K+. Let us explain this in relation to our three-part theorem:
(a) If the observed domain K is small, then reason-based rationalizability in K is only
limited evidence for reason-based rationalizability in the larger domain K+. In the
limit, if K contains only contexts with singleton feasible sets, the agent’s choices
are trivially reason-based rationalizable in K, and we have no evidence for reason-
based rationalizability in K+. By contrast, if K contains a large and representative
mix of contexts – e.g., a sizeable “random sample” of contexts from K+ – then
reason-basedness in K may be good evidence for reason-basedness in K+.
(b) Even if the agent’s choices are robustly reason-based, our reason-based model for K
need not be a portion of a model for K+. The setM(K) specified for some observed
context K may leave out some property that is needed to explain the agent’s choice
in some new context K 0 with P(K 0) = P(K). If so, a reason-based model for K+
could not be an extension of our model for K, since it would have to specify the
same M(K 0) = M(K) for all contexts K 0 with P(K 0) = P(K). The larger and
more representative K is, the less likely this problem is to occur.
(c) Similar remarks apply to the question of whether our model for K, even if it is
extendible to a model for K+, is likely to identify all context properties that are
causally relevant in K+. For example, if K contains no choice contexts o↵ering
luxury goods, then our model for K cannot identify the di↵erence that “o↵ering
luxury goods” might make to the agent’s motivation in contexts with that property.
A large and representative domain K reduces the risk of not identifying some context
properties that are causally relevant in the target domain K+.
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6 Concluding remarks
We have argued that reason-based rationalizations can explain a variety of non-classical
choice behaviours in a unified manner and clarify the di↵erence between “bounded”
and “sophisticated” deviations from classical rationality. Furthermore, unlike classical
choice-theoretic rationalizations in terms of preference relations over options, they allow
us to predict an agent’s choices in genuinely novel contexts, where no observations have
been made. Crucially, di↵erent rationalizations of the same choice behaviour are not
generally equivalent, since some are typically more likely than others to extend robustly
to new choice contexts and thus to lead to accurate predictions of future choices.
Such robustness is related to psychological adequacy. A psychologically ungrounded
explanation of an agent’s observed choices is more likely to “fail” in novel contexts,
because it matches the observations by coincidence rather than for systematic reasons
that continue to apply in novel contexts. Psychological adequacy thus matters for the
sake of predictive accuracy, regardless of whether it matters for its own sake.
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A Appendix
Before giving the proofs, we brieáy discuss related works by Bossert and Suzumura (2009)
(for short, B&S) and Bhattacharyya, Pattanaik, and Xu (2011) (for short, B&P&X).
B&S assume that, in any given choice context, a feasible option may or may not be com-
patible with some exogenously given ënormsí. In our example, picking the only available
apple would violate a politeness norm. B&S axiomatically characterize those choice func-
tions which are norm-conditionally rationalizable: there exists a preference relation over
options such that, in any context, the agent chooses the most preferred norm-compatible
feasible option. One may think of such a rationalization as being ëpartially reason-basedí.
Each norm gives rise to a (context-regarding) property: the property of obeying that
norm. Every such property is taken to be desirable and motivationally salient in each
context. The agentís choice of a norm-compatible option is then explained by the fact
that the option has all those properties (of obeying the norms in question). By contrast,
the question of which of the norm-compatible options is chosen is not explained in terms
of reasons (properties), but in terms of a standard preference relation over primitive
options. B&P&X take a di§erent approach. Like us, they model the agentís concep-
tualization of options, yet not by invoking properties or reasons, but by reÖning the
notion of an option through adding certain ërelevantí information about the context. To
describe Polite Pauline in our example, the options (fruits) would have to be reÖned by
including the information of whether or not the context o§ers another fruit of the same
kind. The reÖnement is carried out by a technical construction.2 B&P&X show that
an agent whose choices among reÖned options are fully rational may nonetheless ëlookí
irrational if his choice function is deÖned over non-reÖned options. Overall, B&Sís and
B&P&Xís analyses convey several important insights relevant to our paper.
Notation. For property bundles S; T  P we write S %-C T to indicate that S and
T are revealed comparable, i.e., that S %C T or T %C S. Furthermore, when we need
to refer explicitly to the underlying model M, we write xMK rather than xK for option
x as conceptualized in context K, and %MK rather than %K for the induced preference
relation in context K. Finally, for brevity, we write MK rather than M(K) to refer
2For B&P&X, a reÖned option is not simply an option-context pair (x;K) (with x 2 K), since such
an object contains the full context information, including any irrelevant information. Rather, B&P&X
deÖne reÖned options as certain equivalence classes of such pairs. In the limiting ëclassicalí case, the
context is totally irrelevant, so that any pairs (x;K) and (x;K0) count as equivalent; hence, reÖned
options reduce to options in the original sense.
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to the set of motivationally salient properties in context K according to motivational
salience function M .
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume Axiom 3. As in Axiom 2, consider contexts K;K 0 2 K such
that (*) fP(y;K) : y 2 Kg = fP(y0;K 0) : y0 2 K 0g. We only show that fP(x;K) :
x 2 C(K)g  fP(x0;K 0) : x0 2 C(K 0)g, since the converse inclusion (ëí) is analogous.
Suppose x 2 C(K). The property bundle P(x;K) is feasible in context K, hence by
(*) also in context K 0. It is revealed weakly preferred to all feasible property bundles
in context K, hence by (*) also to all feasible property bundles in context K 0. So, by
Axiom 3, it is chosen in context K 0, i.e., belongs to fP(x0;K 0) : x0 2 C(K 0)g. 
We give no separate proof of Theorem 1, since this result follows from Proposition 1 and
Theorem 3, both of which we prove below.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let K be closed under cloning (an assumption only needed in part
2).
Step 1. Assume C is rationalized by a reason-based model with context-invariant
and context-unregarding motivation, M = (M;), where M  Poption. We leave the
proof of Axioms 1* and 2* to the reader and here prove Axiom 3*. It su¢ces to show
that C is rationalizable in the classical sense by a binary relation on X (see Remark 1).
SinceM rationalizes C, the choice set C(K) for a context K consists of the %K-highest
option(s) in K, where %MK is the preference relation on X induced by the model M for
context K; this relation is deÖned for all options x; y 2 X by
x %MK y , xMK  yMK ,
where xMK and y
M
K are options x and y as conceptualized in context K. Given the
modelís context-independence (in both senses), xMK and y
M
K do not depend on K (see
Section 2.5). Thus, %MK does not depend on K; we can write it as %M. Therefore the
choice function C is rationalizable in the classical sense by a binary relation (i.e., %M).
Step 2. Now assume Axioms 1*, 2* and 3*. Let% be the classical revealed preference
relation on X: i.e., for all options x; y 2 X, let ëx % yí mean that x is chosen weakly
over y in some context. We prove that C is reason-based rationalizable (for instance)
by the model with context-invariant and context-unregarding motivation M = (M;)
deÖned as follows:
 M is the set Poption of all option properties.
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 For all property bundles S; T  P, ëS  T í means that x % y for some options
x; y 2 X such that P(x) = S and P(y) = T .
Under this model, the options are conceptualized as follows:
xMK = P(x;K) \M = P(x) for all x 2 X and K 2 K. (2)
Clearly, these options-as-conceptualized do not depend on the context K; hence, the
induced preference relation %M (= %MK ) does not depend on the context either.
Let % be the binary relation deÖned as
x % y , [x % y or P(x) = P(y)] for all x; y 2 X.
We have to prove that C = CM. This follows from three facts:
(i) CM is (classically) rationalized by %M;
(ii) C is (classically) rationalized by % and by % (and thus, by any relation % such
that %  %  %);
(iii) %  %M  %.
Fact (i): This holds by deÖnition of CM.
Fact (ii): By Remark 1 (Richterís result), Axiom 3* implies that C is (classically) ra-
tionalizable by a binary relation. One of these rationalizations (in fact, the minimal one)
is the classical revealed preference relation %, as is easily checked and well-known (see
also Richter 1971). Also, % rationalizes C, which can be shown as follows. Consider a
context K. We have to show that
C(K) = fx 2 K : x % y for all y 2 Kg:
Since % extends %, C(K)  fx 2 K : x % y for all y 2 Kg. Conversely, suppose
x 2 K such that x % y for all y 2 K. We show that x 2 C(K). If P(z) = P(x) for
all z 2 K, then C(K) = K by Axiom 1* and the fact that C(K) 6= ?. Thus x 2 C(K),
as required. Now let z 2 K such that P(z) 6= P(x). Consider any y 2 K. We have to
show that x % y. If P(y) 6= P(x), this holds by the deÖnition of % and the fact that
x % y. Now suppose P(y) = P(x). Note that x % z (since x % z and P(z) 6= P(x)).
So, there is a context eK 2 K such that x 2 C( eK). Since P(y) = P(x) and since K is
closed under cloning, there is a context K 0 2 K such that K 0 = eK [ fyg. By Axiom 2*
and the fact that fP(v) : v 2 eKg = fP(v) : v 2 K 0g and x 2 C( eK), we have v 2 C(K 0)
for some v 2 K 0 such that P(v) = P(x). So, by Axiom 1*, x 2 C(K 0). As x 2 C(K 0)
and y 2 K 0, we have x % y, as required.
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Fact (iii): Consider any x; y 2 X. We have to show that
[x % y ) x %M y] and [x %M y ) x % y].
Given that the options-as-conceptualized take the form (2), we have x %M y , P(x) 
P(y). Therefore, we have to prove that
[x % y ) P(x)  P(y)] and [P(x)  P(y)) x % y].
The Örst of these two implications holds immediately by the deÖnition of . As for the
second implication, we suppose P(x)  P(y) and claim that x % y. If P(x) = P(y),
the claim holds by the deÖnition of %. From now on, suppose P(x) 6= P(y). Since
P(x)  P(y), there exist x0; y0 2 X such that P(x0) = P(x), P(y0) = P(y) and x0 % y0.
Since x0 % y0, there is a context K 2 K such that x0 2 C(K) and y0 2 K. Relying twice
on the fact that K is closed under cloning, we can choose a context K 0 2 K such that
K 0 = K [ fx; yg. By Axiom 2* and the fact that fP(z) : z 2 Kg = fP(z) : z 2 K 0g
and x0 2 C(K), we have v 2 C(K 0) for some v 2 K 0 such that P(v) = P(x0). So, by
Axiom 1*, x 2 C(K 0). Since x 2 C(K 0) and y 2 K 0, we have x % y. Hence, x % y, as
required. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider any reason-based modelM = (M;). DeÖne a reason-
based model with context-invariant motivation M0 = (M 0;0) as follows:
 M 0 is any property set such that M 0  [K2K(MK [ P(K)) (= ([K2KMK) [
Pcontext), for instance M 0 = P;
 for any property bundles S; T , ëS 0 T í is deÖned to mean that there exists a
contextK 2 K such that P(K) = S\Pcontext = T \Pcontext and S\MK  T \MK .
We prove that CM = CM0 . Consider an arbitrary context K 2 K; we have to
show that CM(K) = CM0(K). We do so by proving that M and M0 induce the same
preference relation on X in context K. Fix options x; y 2 X. We have to show that
x %MK y , x %M
0
K y, i.e., writing S = P(x;K) and T = P(y;X), that
S \MK  T \MK , S \M 0 0 T \M 0.
We will draw on the fact that (*) P(K) = S \ Pcontext = T \ Pcontext.
ë)í: If S \MK  T \MK , then S 0 T by (*) and the deÖnition of 0, and hence,
S \M 0 0 T \M 0.
ë(í: Now suppose S \M 0 0 T \M 0. By deÖnition of 0, there is a context K 0 2 K
such that P(K 0) = S\Pcontext = T \Pcontext and (S\M 0)\MK0  (T \M 0)\MK0 . We
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deduce two facts: Örst, P(K 0) = P(K) (where we use (*)); second, S \MK0  T \MK0
(where we use thatMK0 M 0). The Örst fact implies thatMK0 =MK (by the deÖnition
of a reason-based model). This, together with the second fact, implies that S \MK 
T \MK , as required. 
Before proving Theorem 3, we Örst show that Axioms 1 and 3 can be jointly summarized
in the following axiom:
Axiom 3+. For every option x in a context K 2 K, if the property bundle P(x;K) is
revealed weakly preferred to the property bundle P(y;K) for every option y in K, then
x 2 C(K).
Lemma 4 Axioms 1 and 3 are jointly equivalent to Axiom 3+.
Proof. ë(í: First assume Axioms 1 and 3. As in Axiom 3+, consider K 2 K and x 2 K
such that P(x;K) %C P(y;K) for all y 2 K. By Axiom 3, P(x;K) is chosen in context
K. So, C(K) contains some x0 such that P(x0;K) = P(x;K). Hence, by Axiom 1,
x 2 C(K).
ë)í: Now assume Axiom 3+. Axiom 3 holds obviously. As for Axiom 1, consider
K 2 K and x; y 2 K such that P(x;K) = P(y;K). We only show that x 2 C(K) )
y 2 C(K); the converse implication is analogous. Let x 2 C(K). Clearly, the property
bundle P(x;K) is revealed weakly preferred to each feasible property bundle in this
context K. The same is therefore true of the property bundle P(y;K) (= P(x;K)). So,
by Axiom 3+, y 2 C(K). 
Proof of Theorem 3. Step 1. Suppose a reason-based model with context-invariant
motivation, (M;), rationalizes C. Axiom 1 holds obviously. To prove Axiom 3, consider
a context K 2 K and a bundle S  P feasible in K such that S %C P(y;K) for each y
in K. Choose an x in K such that S = P(x;K). It su¢ces to show that x 2 C(K), i.e.,
since (M;) rationalizes C, that
P(x;K) \M  P(y;K) \M (3)
for all y 2 K. Consider any y 2 K. Since P(x;K) %C P(y;K), there exist K 0 2 K and
x0; y0 2 K 0 (which may depend on y) such that (i) P(x0;K 0) = P(x;K) and P(y0;K 0) =
P(y;K), and (ii) C(K 0) = x0. By (ii) and the fact that (M;) rationalizes C,
P(x0;K 0) \M  P(y0;K 0) \M:
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By (i), this implies (3), as required.
Step 2. Now assume Axioms 1 and 3. We show that C is rationalizable for instance
by the (rather special) reason-based model with context-invariant motivation (M;) =
(P;%C), where M (which is constant) contains all properties, and  is simply the
relation of revealed weak preference. To show this, consider any context K 2 K and
option x 2 K. We have to show that
x 2 C(K), [P(x;K) \M  P(y;K) \M for all y 2 K,
or equivalently, given our special deÖnitions of M and , that
x 2 C(K), [P(x;K) %C P(y;K) for all y 2 K.
The right-hand side of this equivalence implies that x 2 C(K) by Axiom 3+, where this
axiom holds by Lemma 4. Conversely, if x 2 C(K), then the right-hand side holds by
the deÖnition of the revealed preference relation %C . 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let K 2 K. Suppose P 2 P satisÖes (rev1)-(rev3) for S; S0  P.
We may assume without loss of generality that S is revealed strictly preferred to S0
(rather than vice versa), since (rev1)-(rev3) remain valid if S and S0 are interchanged.
DeÖne both T and T 0 as S. Then (rev1) implies (REV1); (rev2) implies (REV2) (noting
that S is revealed weakly preferred to itself); and (rev3) implies (REV3) because, as
T = T 0 = S, (REV3) requires that the pair (S; S) di§ers minimally from the pair
(S0; S), which in turn reduces to (rev3). 
We now formally re-state and prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 For all revealed comparable bundles S; T  P and revealed comparable bundles
S0; T 0  P, if
 V \Pcontext is the same for all V 2 fS; T; S0; T 0g (i.e., S; T; S0 and T 0 are feasible
in the same type of context),
 S \MCK = S0 \MCK and T \MCK = T 0 \MCK for the contexts K 2 K such that
P(K) = V \ Pcontext for all V 2 fS; T; S0; T 0g,
then S %C T , S0 %C T 0.
Proof. As one may verify, it is su¢cient to show the following condition for all contexts
K 2 K and all Önite property bundles S; S0; T; T 0  P.
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Condition (X S
0;T 0
S;T ): If
(aS
0;T 0
S;T ) S %-C T and S0 %-C T 0,
(bS
0;T 0
S;T ) V \ Pcontext = P(K) for all V 2 fS; T; S0; T 0g,
(cS
0;T 0
S;T ) S \MCK = S0 \MCK and T \MCK = T 0 \MCK ,
then S %C T , S0 %C T 0.
Here it was possible to restrict ourselves to Önite property bundles since whenever one
of the property bundles S; S0; T; T 0 is inÖnite, condition (aS
0;T 0
S;T ) cannot be met (because
feasible property bundles are by assumption Önite).
Fix a context K 2 K. Note that the set of properties in which two property bundles
S; S0  P di§er is the symmetric di§erence S 4 S0. We prove that (XS0;T 0S;T ) holds for
all Önite S; T; S0; T 0  P, by induction on jS 4 S0j + jT 4 T 0j, the total number of
disagreements between S and S0 and between T and T 0.
Initial step. First, consider any Önite S; S0; T; T 0  P such that jS 4 S0j+ jT 4 T 0j =
0. Then S = S0 and T = T 0, so that (XS
0;T 0
S;T ) holds trivially because we have S %C T ,
S0 %C T 0 (even without assuming (aS
0;T 0
S;T )-(c
S0;T 0
S;T )).
Induction step. Consider any m > 0 and suppose that (XS
0;T 0
S;T ) holds for any Önite
S; S0; T; T 0  P such that jS 4 S0j+ jT 4 T 0j < m. Consider Önite sets S; S0; T; T 0  P
such that jS 4 S0j + jT 4 T 0j = m and assume (aS0;T 0S;T )-(cS
0;T 0
S;T ) hold. To show that
S %C T , S0 %C T 0, we consider two cases.
Case 1. The pair (S; T ) di§ers minimally from (S0; T 0), i.e., there is no revealed
comparable pair of property bundles (S00; T 00) (6= (S; T ); (S0; T 0)) such that S00 is weakly
between S and S0 and T 00 is weakly between T and T 0. Suppose, for a contradiction,
that S %C T 6, S0 %C T 0. Since jS 4 S0j + jT 4 T 0j = m > 0, we can choose a
P 2 (S 4 S0) [ (T 4 T 0). We prove that P is revealed motivationally salient in K,
i.e., that P 2 MCK ; this contradicts (cS
0;T 0
S;T ), completing Case 1. By deÖnition of M
C
K ,
this claim follows from three facts: (REV1) holds because S %C T 6, S0 %C T 0 (where
S %-C T and S0 %-C T 0 by (aS
0;T 0
S;T )); (REV2) holds because S and S
0 di§er in P or T
and T 0 di§er in P (since P 2 (S4S0)[ (T 4T 0)) and because of (bS0;T 0S;T ); (REV3) holds
because the pair (S; T ) di§ers minimally from (S0; T 0) by assumption of Case 1.
Case 2. The pair (S; T ) does not di§er minimally from (S0; T 0). Then we may choose
a revealed comparable pair of property bundles (S00; T 00) (6= (S; T ); (S0; T 0)) such that
S00 is weakly between S and S0 and T 00 is weakly between T and T 0. Observe that
jS 4 S00j < jS 4 S0j or jT 4 T 00j < jT 4 T 0j (possibly both). So, jS 4 S00j+ jT 4 T 00j <
jS 4 S0j+ jT 4 T 0j, and hence, jS 4 S00j+ jT 4 T 00j < m. Also, noting that S00 and T 00
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are Önite (since they are feasible in some context as S00 %-C T 00), it follows by induction
hypothesis that the implication (XS
00;T 00
S;T ) holds. Now the three antecedent conditions of
this implication hold. Condition (bS
00;T 00
S;T ) holds because, Örst, S\Pcontext = T\Pcontext =
P(K) by (bS0;T 0S;T ), second, S00 \ Pcontext = S \ Pcontext = S0 \ Pcontext by (bS
0;T 0
S;T ) and
the fact that S00 is weakly between S and S0, and, third, T 00 \ Pcontext = T \ Pcontext =
T 0 \Pcontext for analogous reasons. Condition (aS
00;T 00
S;T ) follows from (a
S0;T 0
S;T ) and the fact
that S00 %-C T 00. Condition (cS
00;T 00
S;T ) may be deduced from (c
S0;T 0
S;T ) and the fact that S
00
is weakly between S and S0 and T 00 is weakly between T and T 0. From (XS
00;T 00
S;T ) and
(aS
00;T 00
S;T )-(c
S00;T 00
S;T ) it follows that S %C T , S00 %C T 00.
By an analogous reasoning applied to the sets S0; S00; T 0; T 00 (rather than S; S00; T; T 00),
we have S0 %C T 0 , S00 %C T 00. This equivalence and the previous one jointly imply
the equivalence S %C T , S0 %C T 0, as required. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Axiom 1** obviously implies Axiom 1. Now assume Axiom 1.
Fix a context K 2 K and options x; y 2 K such that xCK = yCK . We only show that
x 2 C(K) ) y 2 C(K); the converse implication (ë(í) holds analogously. Suppose
x 2 C(K). The proof is in three claims (only the last of which draws on Axiom 1).
Claim 1. There exists a Önite sequence (S1; :::; Sm) of property bundles such that
(i) S1 = P(x;K) and Sm = P(y;K), (ii) S1 %-C Sj for each j 2 f1; :::;mg, (iii) for
all j; j0; j00 2 f1; :::;mg, if j  j0  j00 then Sj0 is weakly between Sj and Sj00 , (iv) for
all j 2 f1; :::;m  1g, Sj 6= Sj+1, and (v) for all j 2 f1; :::;m  1g, no property bundle
S  P is strictly between Sj and Sj+1 and satisÖes S %-C S1.
Let S be the set of all Önite sequences (S1; :::; Sm) of property bundles satisfying
the Örst four conditions (i)-(iv). Since x 2 C(K), we have P(x;K) %C P(x;K) and
P(x;K) %C P(y;K). In particular, P(x;K) %-C P(x;K) and P(x;K) %-C P(y;K).
So, S contains the sequence (P(x;K);P(y;K)) if P(x;K) 6= P(y;K) and contains the
single-component sequence (P(x;K)) if P(x;K) = P(y;K). Hence, S 6= ?.
Next, note that since the property bundles P(x;K) and P(y;K) are Önite, the set
P(x;K)4P(y;K) of properties in which they di§er is also Önite. For all (S1; :::; Sm) 2 S
we have m  1  jP(x;K)4P(y;K)j (= jS1 4 Smj). To prove this, consider any
(S1; :::; Sm) 2 S and let us show by induction that jS1 4 Sj j  j1 for all j 2 f1; :::;mg.
For j = 1 this is obviously true. Now consider any j 2 f1; :::;m1g such that jS1 4 Sj j 
j 1. We have jS1 4 Sj+1j  jS1 4 Sj j+1  j, where the Örst inequality holds because
Sj is strictly between S1 and Sj+1 by (iii) and (iv), and the second inequality holds
because jS1 4 Sj j  j  1. This completes the inductive argument.
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As shown so far, S is non-empty and the length of sequences in S has a Önite upper
bound (given by jP(x;K)4P(y;K)j+1). So there exists a longest sequence in S. Call
it (S1; :::; Sm). We complete the proof of the claim by showing that this sequence also
satisÖes condition (v).
Suppose, for a contradiction, that j 2 f1; :::;m1g and there is a property bundle S 
P which is strictly between Sj and Sj+1 and satisÖes S1 %-C S. Form the augmented
sequence (S1; :::; Sj ; S; Sj+1; :::; Sm). We show that this sequence satisÖes (i)-(iv), i.e.,
belongs to S, a contradiction, since the sequence is longer than (S1; :::; Sm).
First, the augmented sequence obviously still satisÖes (i), (ii) and (iv). It remains to
show that it also satisÖes (iii). To do so, we consider indices i; i0 2 f1; :::;mg and have
to show three things:
(*) if i  i0  j, then Si0 is (weakly) between Si and S;
(**) if j + 1  i  i0, then Si is between S and Si0 ;
(***) if i  j and j + 1  i0, then S is between Si and Si0 .
Regarding (*), assume i  i0  j, and consider a P 2 P on which Si and S agree.
We have to show that Si0 agrees on P with Si (and S). Since S is strictly between Sj
and Sj+1, S agrees on P with at least one of Sj and Sj+1. Let j0 2 fj; j + 1g be such
that S and Sj0 agree on P . So, Si and Sj0 also agree on P . Hence, since Si0 is between
Si and Sj0 (as the original sequence (S1; :::; Sm) satisÖes (iii)), Si0 agrees on P with Si,
as required to prove (*).
The proof of (**) is analogous to that of (*).
Regarding (***), assume i  j and j + 1  i0. Consider any P 2 P on which Si and
Si0 agree. We have to show that S agrees with Si (and Si0) on P . Since the original
sequence (S1; :::; Sm) satisÖes (iii), Sj is between Si and Si0 (if i = j trivially), and so Sj
and Si agree on P . By an analogous argument, Sj+1 and Si agree on P . Hence, Sj and
Sj+1 agree on P . So, as S is (strictly) between Sj and Sj+1, S agrees on P with Sj , and
hence also with Si. This shows (***), completing the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2: If (S1; :::; Sm) is any sequence of property bundles satisfying the conditions
(i)-(v) in Claim 1, then for all j 2 f1; :::;mg neither of the bundles Sj and S1 (= P(x;K))
is revealed strictly preferred to the other.
The proof is by induction on j. If j = 1, the claim holds trivially. Now consider
j 2 f1; :::;m 1g and assume neither of the sets Sj and S1 is revealed strictly preferred
to the other. Suppose, for a contradiction, that one of the sets Sj+1 and S1 is revealed
strictly preferred to the other one. We assume without loss of generality that S1 is
revealed strictly preferred to Sj+1 (the proof proceeds analogously in the other case).
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Since Sj 6= Sj+1 by (iv), we may select a property P 2 Sj 4 Sj+1. Now P is revealed
motivationally salient in K, i.e., P 2 MCK . We show this by verifying the criteria
(REV1)-(REV3) for the pairs of bundles (Sj ; ; S1) and (Sj+1; S1). First, Sj is revealed
weakly preferred to S1 (because S1 is not revealed strictly preferred to Sj by induction
hypothesis and because S1 %-C Sj by (ii)), while S1 is revealed strictly preferred to
Sj+1, where these two choices occur in contexts with the same properties as K (because
S1 = P(x;K) by (i)). Second, Sj and Sj+1 di§er in P (since P 2 Sj 4 Sj+1). Third, by
(v) the pair (S1; Sj) di§ers minimally from (S1; Sj+1) in the sense deÖned in (REV3).
Now, since P 2MCK and since Sj and Sj+1 di§er in P , we have (Sj4Sj+1)\MCK 6= ?.
Further, Sj 4 Sj+1  S1 4 Sm. Indeed, if a property P does not belong to S1 4 Sm,
then S1 and Sm agree on P , so that all of Sj , Sj+1, S1 and Sm agree on P (since Sj
and Sj+1 are each weakly between S1 and Sm by (iii)), which implies that P is not
contained in Sj 4 Sj+1. Since (Sj 4 Sj+1) \MCK 6= ? and Sj 4 Sj+1  S1 4 Sm, we
have (S1 4 Sm) \MCK 6= ?. So, S1 \MCK 6= Sm \MCK . Hence, by (i), P(x;K) \MCK 6=
P(y;K) \MCK , i.e., xCK 6= yCK , contradicting the initial assumption that xCK = yCK . This
proves Claim 2.
Claim 3. y 2 C(K) (which completes the proof of Axiom 1**).
By Claims 1 and 2, P(x;K) is not revealed strictly preferred to P(y;K). So, since
P(x;K) is chosen in K (as x 2 C(K)), so is P(y;K). Using Axiom 1 it follows that
y 2 C(K). 
Proof of Theorem 4 (in its strengthened form given in its footnote). Assume the domain
of contexts K is rich. We prove the necessity of the axioms (step 1), the su¢ciency of
the axioms (step 2), and the essential uniqueness claim (step 3).
Step 1. Suppose C has a reason-based rationalization with revealed motivation
(MC ;). Axioms 1 and 3 hold by Theorem 1. To prove that Axiom 2** holds, consider
contexts K;K 0 2 K such that (*) fxCK : x 2 Kg = fx0CK0 : x0 2 K 0g. We only show that
fyCK : y 2 C(K)g  fy0CK0 : y0 2 C(K 0)g, since the converse inclusion holds analogously.
Consider any y 2 C(K). We have to show that yCK 2 fy0CK0(y0) : y0 2 C(K 0)g. By (*)
there is a y0 2 K 0 such that (**) yCK = y0CK0 . It remains to show that y0 2 C(K 0). Since
y 2 C(K) and C is rationalized by (MC ;), we have
yCK  xCK for all x 2 K.
By (*) and (**), this implies that
y0CK0  x0CK0 for all x0 2 K 0.
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It follows that y0 2 C(K 0), again because C is rationalized by (MC ;). This proves
Axiom 2**.
Step 2. Conversely, assume Axioms 1, 2** and 3. We show in two claims that the
revealed model (MC ;C) rationalizes C.
Claim 1. For all contexts K;K 0 2 K and all options x; y 2 K and x0; y0 2 K 0, if
xCK = x
0C
K0 and y
C
K = y
0C
K0 then P(x;K) %C P(y;K), P(x0;K 0) %C P(y0;K 0).
Consider K;K 0 2 K, x; y 2 K and x0; y0 2 K 0 such that xCK = x0CK0 and yCK = y0CK0 .
We assume that P(x0;K 0) %C P(y0;K 0) and show that P(x;K) %C P(y;K); the converse
implication is analogous.
Since K is rich and the bundles P(x;K) and P(y;K) are feasible in K, there is a
context L 2 K in which they are the only feasible bundles:
fP(z; L) : z 2 Lg = fP(x;K);P(y;K)g: (4)
Now P(K) = P(L), since each side of this equality can be written as S \ Pcontext for a
bundle S feasible in K and L. It follows that MCK = M
C
L . On each side of (4) we now
intersect each contained bundle with MCK (= M
C
L ). This yields a new identity:
fzCL : z 2 Lg = fxCK ; yCKg: (5)
The steps taken for x; y;K are now repeated for x0; y0;K 0. By the richness of K and
the feasibility of the bundles P(x0;K 0) and P(y0;K 0) in K 0, there is a context L0 2 K
such that
fP(z; L0) : z 2 L0g = fP(x0;K 0);P(y0;K 0)g: (6)
By arguments made similarly above, it follows that MCK0 = M
C
L0 and
fzCL0 : z 2 L0g = fx0CK0 ; y0CK0g: (7)
From (5), (7) and the assumption that xCK = x
0C
K0 and y
C
K = y
0C
K0 , we deduce that
fzCL : z 2 Lg = fzCL0 : z 2 L0g. So, by Axiom 2**,
fzCL : z 2 C(L)g = fzCL0 : z 2 C(L0)g: (8)
By Axiom 3, (6) and the assumption that the bundle P(x0;K 0) is revealed weakly pre-
ferred to P(y0;K 0) (and thus also to itself), the bundle P(x0;K 0) is chosen in L0:
P(x0;K 0) 2 fP(z; L0) : z 2 C(L0)g.
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Intersecting on both sides of this relation with MCK0 (= M
C
L0) yields
x0CK0 2 fzCL0 : z 2 C(L0)g.
By (8) and the fact that xCK = x
0 C
K0 , we can rewrite the last relation as
xCK 2 fzCL : z 2 C(L)g.
Pick a z 2 C(L) such that xCK = zCL : By (4) we can also pick a w 2 L such that
P(w;L) = P(x;K). Intersecting each side of this equation with MCL (= MCK) yields
wCL = x
C
K . Hence, w
C
L = z
C
L . By Axiom 1** (which holds by Lemma 3), it follows that
w 2 C(L). So, the bundle P(w;L) = P(x;K) is revealed weakly preferred to any bundle
feasible in L, hence by (4) to P(y;K).
Claim 2. (MC ;C) rationalizes C (which completes the su¢ciency proof).
We consider any K 2 K and x 2 K and have to show that
x 2 C(K), xCK C yCK for all y 2 K .
First, if x 2 C(K), then for all y 2 K we indeed have xCK(x) C yCK , immediately by
deÖnition of C . Now assume that xCK C yCK for all y 2 K. Consider any y 2 K. Since
xCK C yCK , by deÖnition of C there exist K 0 2 K and x0; y0 2 K 0 (all of which may
depend on y) such that xCK = x
0 C
K , y
C
K = y
0 C
K and x
0 2 C(K 0). Since x0 2 C(K 0) and
y0 2 K 0, we have P(x0;K 0) %C P(y0;K 0). So, by Claim 1, P(x;K) %C P(y;K). Since
this is true for all y 2 K, we have x 2 C(K), by Axiom 3+ (which holds by Lemma 4).
Step 3. We now consider an arbitrary rationalization of C with revealed motivation
(MC ;), and have to show that it is essentially identical to (MC ;C) (which rationalizes
C by part 2). As the two models ascribe the same motivation to the agent, it remains to
show that  and C coincide wherever they are choice-behaviourally relevant. Consider
a pair of bundles S; T  P at which  and C are choice-behaviourally relevant; we can
thus pick K 2 K and x; y 2 K such that
S = xCK and T = y
C
K : (9)
We have to show that S  T , S C T .
Claim 3. S  S and S C S.
Since the domain of contexts K is rich and the (identical) property bundles P(x;K)
and P(x;K) are feasible in context K, there is a context K 2 K in which only the
bundle P(x;K) is feasible. Choose any x 2 C(K). Clearly,
P(x;K) = P(x;K): (10)
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It follows that P(K) = P(K), and hence, that MCK = MCK : This and (10) imply
that xCK = x
C
K
. Now since x 2 C(K) and each of the models (MC ;) and (MC ;C)
rationalizes C, we have xC
K
 xC
K
and xC
K
C xC
K
. This proves the claim since S =
xCK = x
C
K
.
Claim 4. S  T , S C T (which completes the proof).
Since P(x;K) and P(y;K) are both feasible in K, richness of K implies that there
is a context ~K 2 K in which only these two property bundles are feasible. Choose any
~x; ~y 2 ~K such that
P(~x; ~K) = P(x;K) and P(~y; ~K) = P(y;K): (11)
From any of these equations it follows that P( ~K) = P(K), whence MC~K = MCK . This
and the equations (9) and (11) imply that S = ~xC~K and T = ~y
C
~K
. So, fzC~K : z 2 ~Kg =
fS; Tg. Hence, as the model (MC ;) rationalizes C and as S  S by Claim 3,
~x 2 C( ~K), S  T: (12)
Analogously, as (MC ;C) rationalizes C and as S C S,
~x 2 C( ~K), S C T: (13)
The equivalences (12) and (13) imply that S  T , S C T . 
Proof of Proposition 3. LetM0 = (M 0;) be a reason-based model for a domainD  K+.
Regarding part (a), if allM 0K coincide, then obviously CAU
M0 = ?; and if CAUM0 = ?,
then part (b) will imply that all M 0K coincide. It thus remains to prove part (b). We
proceed by contraposition. Let K;K 0 2 D satisfy M 0K 6= M 0K0 . Since P(x;K) and
P(x;K 0) are Önite for any x 2 X, P(K) and P(K 0) are Önite, and thus the ëdisagreement
setí P(K)4P(K 0) is Önite. So, as one easily checks, there is a Önite sequenceK1; :::;Kn 2
D withK1 = K,Kn = K 0 such that for eachm 2 f1; :::; n1g the contextsKm andKm+1
di§er minimally (in the sense of (cau3)). SinceM 0K1 6=M 0Kn , there is anm 2 f1; :::; n1g
such that M 0Km 6= M 0Km+1 . By the deÖnition of reason-based models, it follows that
P(Km) 6= P(Km+1). Hence we may pick a context property P 2 P(Km)4P(Km+1). It
follows that P 2 P(K)4P(K 0). So, since also P 2 CAUM0 (as the criteria (cau1)-(cau3)
hold for the contextsKm andKm+1), we have P 2 (P(K)\CAUM0)4(P(K 0)\CAUM0).
Hence, P(K) \ CAUM0 6= P(K 0) \ CAUM0 . 
Proof of Remark 2. Consider a rationalization M = (M;) of the choice function
C. Let M1 = (M1;), M2 = (M2;), and M3 = (M3;) be the models used
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to deÖne, respectively, the cautious, semi-courageous, and courageous predictors, with
corresponding domains D1, D2, and D3.
(a) CM1 extends C because M1 extends M (as a consequence of the deÖnition of
M1) and CM = C (by assumption).
(b) We prove that CM2 extends CM1 by showing that M2 extends M1. Consider
any K 2 D1. We have to show that K 2 D2 and M1K = M2K . Since K 2 D1 there is
an L 2 K such that fP (x;K) : x 2 Kg = fP (x; L) : x 2 Lg. One easily veriÖes the
conditions (i) (by using the same context L) and (ii) (by using the context L0 := L ).
(c) It su¢ces to show that M3 extends M2. Let K 2 D2; so conditions (i) and (ii)
hold. We have to show that K 2 D3 and M2K = M3K . Now (i) immediately implies (i*)
(use the same L 2 K), and so K 2 D3. Moreover, M2K = M3K , because each side equals
ML for L as in (i). 
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider a rationalization M = (M;) of the choice function C.
We use the notation from our proof of Remark 2. Further, for any model M0, the set
of feasible options as conceptualized in a context K (from the domain ofM0) is denoted
KM0 := fxM0K : x 2 Kg.
(a) Suppose C+ is rationalizable by an arbitrary model M+ = (M+;+) on the
domain K+. Consider any K 2 D1 and x 2 K. We have to show that x 2 CM1(K) ,
x 2 C+(K). As K 2 D1 we can pick an L 2 K such that
fP(y;K) : y 2 Kg = fP(y; L) : y 2 Lg: (14)
So KM1 = LM1 and KM+ = LM+ (though perhaps KM1 6= KM+). Now pick a z 2 L
such that P(x;K) = P(z; L) (which is possible by (14)). It follows that xM1K = zM
1
L and
xM+K = z
M+
L . We show the claimed equivalence by proving that each side holds if and
only if z 2 C(L):
x 2 CM1(K) , xM1K  S for all S 2 KM
1
by deÖnition of CM1
, zM1L  S for all S 2 LM
1
as xM1K = z
M1
L and K
M1 = LM1
, z 2 CM1(L) by deÖnition of CM1
, z 2 C(L) as CM1(L) = C(L) by Remark 2,
x 2 C+(K) , x 2 CM+(K) as CM+ = C+
, xM+K + S for all S 2 KM
+
by deÖnition of CM+
, zM+L + S for all S 2 LM
+
as xM+K = z
M+
L and K
M+ = LM+
, z 2 CM+(L) by deÖnition of CM+
, z 2 C(L) as CM+(L) = C+(L) = C(L).
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(b) Now let C+ be rationalizable by an extensionM+ = (M+;) ofM. Let K 2 D2
and x 2 K. We show that x 2 CM2(K), x 2 C+(K). AsK 2 D2 we can pick L;L0 2 K
such that P(L) = P(K) and (*) KM2 = (L0)M2 . By (*) we can choose a z 2 L0 such
that (**) xM2K = z
M2
L0 . Since M
+
L0 =M
2
L0 (=ML0),
(L0)M
+
= (L0)M
2
and zM
+
L0 = z
M2
L0 : (15)
As M+L =M
2
L (=ML) and P(L) = P(K), we have M+K =M2K , and thus
KM
+
= KM
2
and xM
+
K = x
M2
K : (16)
By (*), (**), (15) and (16), we have (***) KM+ = (L0)M+ and (****) xM+K = z
M+
L0 .
One can show the claimed equivalence by proving that each side holds if and only if
z 2 C(L). One should follow the steps taken similarly in the proof of part (a): it su¢ces
to replace L by L0 andM1 byM2, and to apply the identities (*)-(****).
(c) Finally, let C+ be rationalizable by an extension M+ = (M+;) of M with
CAUM+ = CAUM. Let K 2 D3 and x 2 K. We prove x 2 CM3(K) , x 2 C+(K).
Since K 2 D3, we can pick L;L0 2 K such that P(L) \ CAUM = P(K) \ CAUM,
M3K = M
3
L, and (
+) KM3 = (L0)M3 . Since CAUM+ = CAUM and P(L) \ CAUM =
P(K)\CAUM, we have P(L)\CAUM+ = P(K)\CAUM+ , and thus by Proposition
3 M+L = M
+
K . By (
+) there is a z 2 L0 such that (++) xM3K = zM
3
L0 . Since M
+
L0 = M
3
L0
(=ML0), we have
(L0)M
+
= (L0)M
3
and zM
+
L0 = z
M3
L0 : (17)
Since M+L =M
3
L (=ML), M
+
L =M
+
K and M
3
L =M
3
K , we have M
+
K =M
3
K , and thus
KM
+
= KM
3
and xM
+
K = x
M3
K : (18)
By (+), (++), (17) and (18), we have (+++) KM+ = (L0)M+ and (++++) xM+K = z
M+
L0 .
The claimed equivalence can once again be proved by establishing that each side holds
if and only if z 2 C(L); one should use the same argument as for part (a), replacing L
by L0 andM1 byM3, and drawing on the identities (+)-(++++). 
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